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ABSTRACT
We propose a system which enables access to the user’s Per-
sonal Health Record (PHR) in the event of emergency. The
access typically occurs in an ad-hoc and spontaneous man-
ner and the user is usually unconscious, hence rendering the
unavailability of the user’s password to access the PHR. The
proposed system includes a smart card carried by the user
at all time and it is personalized with a pseudo secret, an
URL to the PHR Server, a secret key shared with the PHR
Server and a number of redemption tokens generated using
a hash chain. In each emergency session, a one-time use
redemption token is issued by the smart card, allowing the
emergency doctor to retrieve the user’s PHR upon success-
ful authentication of his credentials and validation of the
redemption token. The server returns the PHR encrypted
with a one-time session key which can only be decrypted by
the emergency doctor. The devised interaction protocol to
facilitate emergency access to the user’s PHR is secure and
efficient.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.3 [Special-Purpose and Application-Based Systems]:
Smartcards; H.4 [Information Systems Applications]:
Miscellaneous
General Terms
Design, Management, Security
Keywords
Authentication, access control, emergency access, patient
health record
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing need for a systematic management of
health and medical data. Diagnostic reports from different
hospitals or clinics, prescriptions, medication consumption
logs, etc must be kept securely and access to such medical
data must be convenient to the user and her physician during
treatment. The health data management application is par-
ticularly useful for patients who suffer from chronic diseases
and elderly who tend to be forgetful and requires assistance
in managing their health records. The concept of Personal
Health Record (PHR) [5, 7] that can be solely managed by
the users themselves is ideal for storing and controlling ac-
cess to the users’ health data. Electronic Medical Records
(EMR) and Electronic Health Records (EHR) maintained
by the healthcare providers can be imported into the user’s
PHR, allowing ubiquitous access to the user’s health data
whenever an Internet connection is available.
Due to the sensitivity and confidential nature of the PHR,
access to the PHR is restricted to the users themselves as
they typically do not want to share their medical records
with others. However, the elderly may choose to delegate
the task of managing their medical records by granting full
(or subset of) permission to their family member who is
more competent. Access control policies can be specified a
priori to grant access to the respective entity to the PHR
using Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [15], password-
based access control, specifying an access control list, etc.
However, in an emergency situation, such pre-defined access
control policies fall short because there is no policy defined
a priori that would allow any emergency doctor and ambu-
lance team to access the user’s PHR when providing emer-
gency treatment. If the user is unconscious, this implies
that the password to access the PHR cannot be obtained
either. Existing services [1, 7] shows that it is beneficial if
some background information about the user’s health condi-
tion can be provided while treating the user in the event of
emergency. In the US, there were 108,000 deaths last year
from preventable medical errors, and 93% of those errors
could have been avoided if the doctor had needed informa-
tion about the patient when first being treated [1].
One of the main security challenges in the emergency situ-
ation is to prevent the misuse of this emergency trigger as
such break-the-glass access to the user’s PHR can be ex-
ploited unlawfully. Essentially, it is difficult for the PHR
Server to distinguish between a genuine emergency situa-
tion and a malicious attempt to access the PHR because in
both scenarios, the user is deemed unavailable. In this pa-
per, we propose a system which enables secure and efficient
access to the user’s PHR in an emergency situation. The
user carries a smart card that has been personalized with
a pseudo secret, an URL to the PHR Server, a secret key
shared with the PHR Server and a number of redemption
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tokens generated using a hash chain. In each emergency ses-
sion, a one-time use redemption token is issued by the smart
card, allowing the emergency doctor’s device to retrieve the
user’s PHR upon successful authentication of his credentials
and validation of the redemption token. The server returns
the PHR encrypted with a one-time session key which can
only be decrypted by the emergency doctor.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses vari-
ous related work. Section 3 presents the threat model, while
Section 4 introduces our approach to provide one-time secure
emergency access to PHR. Section 5 presents some discus-
sions and we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. RELATED WORK
The current practise for allowing emergency access in the
hospital is by requiring the emergency doctor to send an
access request indicating an emergency override [13]. Ac-
cess is granted if the requesting entity has the appropriate
credentials, i.e., the requesting entity is a certified medical
doctor. Access is logged and post-access auditing is per-
formed to determine the legitimacy of the access. However,
such mechanism is ineffective as damage to the user’s health
data has been done if the emergency override was malicious.
Essentially, auditing cannot detect malicious access to the
PHR and only serve as deterrent.
Akteonline [17] is a secure data storage service and it pro-
vides flexible access management functions to EHR. The
owner of the EHR is able to specify one-time access to parts
of his records by using TAN which is essentially a transac-
tion number (or secret) that grants permissions to an entity
to access the EHR. In emergency situation, a read-only ac-
cess can be configured to allow emergency doctors to access
emergency subset of the patient’s EHR. The web address,
username and the emergency TAN (transaction number) are
printed on a small wallet card to be carried at all time by
the user. With the possession of this small wallet card, the
emergency doctor can access the user’s contact information,
information about allergies, confirmed diseases and a list of
actual medications when treating the patient in an emer-
gency situation. Unfortunately, there are no guards against
theft in that whoever finds or steals the card can access the
PHR. Renewal of emergency TAN must be done via Akteon-
line and the card must be replaced with the new one.
AccessMyRecords [1], ICER-2-GO [6] provide a service that
enables the doctors, hospitals and emergency responders to
have access to the user’s medical information. These typi-
cally comply with the Break-Glass approach [2]. A medical
card (e.g., AccessID card) is issued to the user who has reg-
istered with the service. It is noted that the user is expected
to carry this card at all times. Typically the medical card
contains the user’s name, a passcode and an URL to access
the medical record printed on it. In emergency situation
where the user is unconscious, the medical personnel can
look for the user’s medical card and subsequently log into
the service portal, using the user’s name and passcode found
on the medical card. A read-only summary (or subset) of
the user’s medical and legal records will be granted access
to the emergency personnel. Essentially, the ease of access
in these services is traded off with low security, as anyone
gaining possession of the medical card will gain access to the
user name, passcode and eventually read-only access to the
user’s PHR. The fact that passcode is printed in clear on
the card does not provide any security.
An alternative to storing the user’s PHR in the cloud is to
keep it in a small USB-based PHR device that allows the
user to easily transport their personal health information.
The Personal HealthKey (CapMed, Newtown, PA) and the
E-HealthKEY (MedicAlert, Turlock, CA) [18] are examples
of such device that use flash memory and a USB port to
store a variety of health information. Both devices offers
password security and encryption, and allow the user to de-
cide which information on the USB device to share. These
devices also have an emergency function that allows respon-
ders to access a subset of medical information without a
password. An analysis by [18] reveals that the security pro-
tection is weak because instead of encrypting their contents
with the password chosen by the user, the devices store the
user’s password as a string in the database, and then en-
crypt that database with a common password fixed by the
manufacturer, which was the same across all devices. Conse-
quently, this enables the device manufacturer to have access
to all content in the devices.
Huda et al [12] introduces a privacy-aware protocol for han-
dling access to the patient-controlled PHR in the emergency
situations. The user carries a health IC cards and it contains
an emergency access module. The emergency access mod-
ule has a dedicated rewritable memory portion for storing
emergency access digital pseudonyms and emergency access
token (EAT). Upon successful authentication of the emer-
gency doctor, the pseudonyms and EAT are forwarded to the
P 3HR [11] server to access the user’s PHR. The EAT can
only be used one time by a doctor, this is implemented by
logging the accessing doctor’s identification information in
the health IC card’s dedicated memory space. This scheme
relies on the information in the smart card’s dedicated mem-
ory space to prevent replay attacks, it is advocated that the
access log should be maintained by the P 3HR server and
request to access the PHR can be denied if the doctor is
found to have previously accessed the PHR. Attacks on the
smart card’s memory space can be launched to remove the
last accessing doctor’s identification information.
3. THREAT MODEL
This section describes the threat model of the proposed sys-
tem:
• Misuse of break-the-glass provision: Break-the-glass
provision is typically used to enable healthcare work-
ers to gain access to the user’s PHR in the event of
emergency, even though they are not allowed access ac-
cording to the patient’s privacy policy. However, such
provision could be misused and exploited, resulting in
the violation of the user’s privacy. It is important to
determine the genuinity of the emergency before access
can be granted.
• Replay of PHR Redemption Token : An attacker may
try to re-use the redemption token from the previous
emergency sessions in order to get access to the PHR of
the user afterward. Thus, the redemption token must
be of one-time use.
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• Denial-of-Service: In the proposed system, the smart
card contains limited number of tokens. An attacker
could query the smart card multiple times for the re-
demption tokens and then use them at a later stage.
This also renders the smart card unusable in the event
of emergency in the future. This attack can be pre-
vented by configuring the smart card such that it would
not reveal any new redemption token if the previous
emergency access session is not completed.
• Theft : An attacker could also steal the smart card
and use it to access the user’s PHR. Authentication
and access control means must be in placed, and the
system must be able to determine whether the user is
really in the state of emergency.
4. ONE-TIME SECURE EMERGENCY AC-
CESS
In our system, we assume that the user carries with him
a smart card. It must be provided or in possession by the
medical personnel in order to trigger the emergency access.
In Germany, a smart card [4] is introduced which users carry
with them and it contains the important health related in-
formation; Such smart card could potentially be used for
the functionality we are proposing in this paper. This smart
card should be treated like a credit card in that the infor-
mation it contains must be kept to the user herself. In case
of emergency and that the user is unconscious, the doctor
can get hold of the smart card and use the information to
request a one-time emergency access to the PHR Server. In
case that the smart card is stolen, the user must report loss
in order to disable any emergency access to the PHR.
As a countermeasure against theft, the possession of the
smart card does not necessarily mean that the requesting
entity has emergency access to the user’s PHR. Policies must
be defined in the PHR Server to only allow certified doctors
or medical personnel who can provide information from the
smart card to trigger emergency access. Similarly, the doctor
who does not have the information from the smart card is
not authorized to initiate the emergency access.
A one-time session key for use by the emergency doctor to
access the user’s PHR is generated between the PHR server
and the doctor. This ensures that access to the PHR is
only valid for one single session. Additionally, as the PHR
is encrypted using the one-time session key, this provides
confidentiality to the user’s PHR and it also enables the
emergency doctor to ascertain the authenticity of the PHR
received from the PHR server.
Figure 1 illustrates an overview of the interaction between
the user, PHR Server and emergency doctor in order to fa-
cilitate secure spontaneous access to the user’s PHR in an
emergency situation.
4.1 Initial Personalisation of Smart Card
The user first signs up for a PHR account in which a smart
card is personalized with a pseudo-secret in clear form that
is used to uniquely identify the user’s PHR, an URL to the
PHR Server, a secret key shared with the PHR Server and
a number of encrypted redemption tokens.
4.1.1 Pseudo-secret
The PHR server first chooses a random number K1 as the
first key of the hash chain [14]. A hash function is applied on
the key to compute the next key on the chain. This process
is repeated for n − 1 times (i.e., the number of supported
emergency sessions) to generate a hash chain as follows:
K1 → K2=H[K1] → K3=H[K2] → ... → Kn=H[Kn−1]
The hash chain has a one-way property in that given Kn, it
is computationally infeasible for an attacker to derive Kn−1.
The hash chain is unique to each individual user and it serves
as an identifier for the PHR of the user. The key in the
hash chain is used to determine the authenticity of the user’s
PHR. The hash chain is used in reverse order and Kn is
denoted as the pseudo-secret of the user and personalised in
the user’s smart card.
4.1.2 Redemption Tokens
In addition to the hash chain, the PHR server generates
n− 1 redemption tokens rk1..n−1. The server first generates
n− 1 independent identifiers, X1..n−1 using a random num-
ber generator and then encrypts them with keys from the
hash chain, Ki in the following way to create the redemption
tokens:
rkn−1=EKn−1(Xn−1)
rkn−2=EKn−2(Xn−2)
...
rk1=EK1(X1)
The redemption tokens are used in descending order where
rkn−1 is used first. These tokens are only known between the
user’s smart card and the PHR Server, the emergency doctor
who uses the redemption token cannot decrypt the token,
hence preventing replay prior to obtaining a permission to
access the PHR. It is also assume that the PHR Server shares
a secret keyKID with each user’s smart card, and it is stored
in the secure memory location of the smart card. As each
token is encrypted with a key from the hash chain and that
the key is only known to the PHR Server, it is not possible
for an attacker to neither create a new token nor modify the
token.
In essence, the smart card contains the pseudo-secret key,
Kn in clear, an URL to access the PHR Server and a list of
(encrypted) redemption tokens and a secret key shared with
the PHR Server:
Pseudo-secret: Kn
URL: www.personalPHR.com/emergency
Redemption Tokens: rkn−1, rkn−2, ..., rk2, rk1
Secret-key: KID
The user is assumed to carry the smart card at all times.
This personalisation process is shown as Step 1 in Figure 1.
4.2 Policy Specification
The PHR Server is responsible for managing access to the
user’s PHR. There are two types of policies that can be spec-
ified at the PHR Server, namely the access control policies
Third International Workshop on Security and Privacy in Spontaneous Interaction and Mobile Phone Use (IWSSI/SPMU)
June 12, 2011, San Francisco, CA, USA
Figure 1: Interaction protocol to facilitate secure emergency access to PHR.
and obligation policies. These policies are typically defined
to facilitate access to the user’s PHR in the normal day-
to-day operation, e.g., granting access to family members
to access the user’s PHR, allowing the user to update her
health record, import medical histories from EMR and EHR,
etc. It is conceivable that additional policies can be speci-
fied to adapt to the emergency situation. In this section, we
provide a few examples of policies that could be deployed to
deal with emergency access.
4.2.1 Obligation policy
The obligation policy is an event-condition-action rule that
defines the actions that need to be performed as part of
the system management when certain event occurs and the
contextual conditions such as time, location, etc are true.
Figure 2 shows an example of obligation policy to manage
the access to the PHR in the emergency situation. When
the PHR Server is notified that an event indicating an emer-
gency request to access the user’s PHR has occurred, the
PHR server must place an automated call to the user to
confirm whether this is an emergency situation and subse-
quently invokes an action to verify the access request.
4.2.2 Access Control Policy
The access control policy grants permission to entities re-
questing access to the resources in the PHR Server based
on the possessed credentials or attributes such as the roles
assigned to the entity.
As an example, Figure 3 shows an access control policy that
On emergencyEvent(credential, token, identifier)
Do
user = retrieve(identifier)
If (call(user.telephone) == EMERGENCY)
requestAccess(credential, token, user)
Else
abort()
Figure 2: Example of obligation policy
verifies the access request and determines whether the emer-
gency doctor (subject) is allowed to access the subset of the
user’s PHR (target). The verify(credential) method in the
policy triggers an action on the PHR Server to verify the
credential of the emergency doctor, e.g., verifying the at-
tribute certificate presented by the doctor to prove that he
is a certified doctor [10]. The verify(token, user.identifier)
method ensures that the redemption token received is fresh
and have not been tampered with.
auth+ requestAccess(credential, token, user)
subject doctor = verify(credential)
target PHR = user.retrieveEmergencyPHR()
action PHR.send(doctor)
when verify(token, user.identifier) == SUCCESS
Figure 3: Example of access control policy
Both the access control and obligation policies can be spec-
ified and deployed using any of the suitable policy specifi-
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cation languages and its enforcement architecture such as
XACML [3], SAML [8], or Ponder2 [16], etc.
4.3 Triggering Emergency Access
In the event of emergency in which the user is unconscious
and requires urgent medical treatment, the emergency doc-
tor and his Emergency Medical Team (EMT) first locate the
user’s smart card and use a portable device to retrieve in-
formation from the smart card.
As shown in Step 3 in Figure 1, the smart card returns
the pseudo-secret Kn and the ith redemption token, rki =
EKi−1(Xi). The pseudo-secret uniquely identifies the user’s
PHR, while the redemption token grants emergency access
to the doctor. In the next emergency session, a new redemp-
tion token, rki−1 = EKi−2(Xi−1) is issued along with the
user’s pseudo-secret.
Step 4 and 5 — Authentication: Once the doctor’s portable
device has successfully obtained the Kn, rki and i (which
indicates the position of the current key in the hash chain)
from the smart card, it sends a request to the PHR server
indicating an emergency access to the user’s PHR is needed.
Together with the access request, an authentication means
must be provided, e.g., an SPKI attribute certificate, X.509v3
Certificate, SAML Token, etc. The PHR Server authenti-
cates the requesting entity and returns either authentication
failure or successful message.
Step 6 : Upon successful authentication, the doctor gener-
ates a random number, x locally to be used to compute a
one-time session key to encrypt the PHR.
Step 7 - 9 — Evaluation of policies: An emergency access
request containing the pseudo-secret Kn, redemption token
rki, iterator i, random number x, signed using the doctor’s
credential and encrypted using the PHR Server’s public-key
is sent to the PHR Server. This request is captured as an
event, thus triggering the execution of the obligation policy
to initiate an automated call to contact the user to determine
whether the user is in emergency situation. As indicated in
the policy, the emergency access request will be immedi-
ately aborted if the user indicates otherwise. Subsequently
the evaluation of the access control policy is triggered to de-
termine whether permission can be granted. Based on the
pseudo-secret Kn, the PHR server locates the user’s corre-
sponding hash chain and advances the hash chain backward
to obtain Ki−1. The redemption token is then decrypted
using Ki−1. It is also important to ensure that the token
has never been used before, otherwise the PHR server aborts
the session and will not release the user’s PHR.
Step 10 and 11 —One-time session key establishment : When
access has been granted by the policy, and the emergency
situation has been ascertained, the PHR server generates a
one-time secret key z = x ⊕ Ki−1. The PHR server then
uses the secret key, z to encrypt the user’s PHR.
Step 12 - 13 — Access to the PHR: The encrypted PHR
is sent to the doctor’s portable device, along with the key
Tk=(Ki−1)KID . The key Ki−1 is encrypted with KID, in
which only the user’s smart card has the capability of de-
crypting it. This means that the doctor’s device has access
to neither the Ki−1 nor KID and hence it is not yet able to
compute the one-time secret.
Step 14 - 18 : An additional step to interact with the smart
card is necessary by sending the received Tk to the smart
card for decryption. If successful, the key Ki−1 decrypted
from Tk is revealed to the doctor’s device, thus enabling it
to compute the one-time secret, z. However, prior to that,
the smart card must first ensure that Ki−1 is authentic and
it corresponds to the identity of the user, thus ensuring that
the correct PHR is retrieved. This is realized by applying the
hash function to Ki−1 and the resulting hash values repeat-
edly until it arrives at Kn which is essentially the pseudo-
secret of the user. This serves as a way to authenticate the
PHR Server as only the PHR Server knows the entire hash
chain. The doctor’s device can also perform the routine in
order to determine the authenticity of the PHR.
H[Ki−1] → ... → H[Kn−1] = Kn
Finally, the doctor decrypts the PHR using the one time
secret z. In this case, the user’s original password or secret
to access the PHR is not revealed to anyone due to the
emergency needs.
4.4 Audit Log
Since the emergency access was performed without getting
direct user consent, it is important that the PHR server
logs all the emergency access information and report to the
user as soon as possible. Such audit log not only guarantees
non-repudiation in which the emergency doctor cannot deny
requesting access to the user’s PHR in emergency situations,
it also serves as an important piece of information to the
intrusion detection system to detect any malicious attempt
by attackers to exploit the emergency access trigger.
5. DISCUSSION
It is the aim of this paper to ensure that the emergency doc-
tor only has one-time access to user’s PHR in an emergency
situation, hence preventing any replay attacks. The pseudo-
secret and the redemption token obtained from the user’s
smart card cannot be replayed because the PHR Server
keeps track of the used tokens. In order for the same emer-
gency doctor to access the user’s PHR again, the doctor
must retrieve a new redemption token from the smart card.
Additionally, the PHR Server which keeps an audit log can
detect whether a doctor is attempting to access the user’s
PHR record multiple times and can therefore deny the access
request.
The proposed protocol is designed to prevent multiple times
querying attacks in which the attackers attempt to query
the smart card multiple times, while keeping the retrieved
redemption tokens for use at a later time. As the protocol
has two interactions with the user’s smart card, the inter-
mediary (i.e., the doctor’s device) cannot gain access to the
user’s PHR without possessing the smart card in hand. Al-
though the attacker could send the unused redemption token
to retrieve the PHR, it does not have the capability to de-
crypt it because in order to compute the session key z, it
must obtain the key share Ki−1 from the user’s smart card
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as shown in Step 12 - 18. Additionally, the smart card is
configured not to reveal any new redemption token if the
previous handshake is not completed, thus preventing the
attacker to collect redemption tokens for later use. This
also serves as a guard against potential Denial-of-Service at-
tacks to render the smart card unusable in the emergency
situation.
Key escrow [9] and key recovery mechanisms that are used
by the government agencies to get access to encrypted com-
munication could be adapted for use in the context of emer-
gency situation as key escrow is typically used for key backup,
enabling the users to recover lost secret-keys. In general, the
key escrow scheme could be used to allow emergency doctor
to recover the user’s password for accessing the PHR in case
of emergency. However, a trusted third party (TTP) must
be nominated to act as the escrow agent, which in the case of
emergency can reveal the password or key for accessing the
patient’s PHR to the requesting entity. This introduces an
additional entity that the user and the doctor have to trust.
Additionally, it has the disadvantage in that the user’s secret
is broken for use in the emergency situation and this does
not provide backward secrecy to the information encrypted
using the same secret-key in the past. Furthermore, users
generally re-use the same password for many different ser-
vices in the cloud, and when this secret is broken or revealed,
this also means that access to the user’s other protected in-
formation is made possible using the broken password.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Without any security provisioning, emergency access can be
easily exploited and thus allowing non-authorized parties to
have access to the user’s PHR using this trigger. In this
paper, we have proposed a novel scheme to ensure the user’s
privacy and safety, while enabling a doctor to obtain the
user’s medical history and allergies information when pro-
viding medical treatment to the user in an emergency situ-
ation.
Specifically, we have introduced: (i) secret binding between
the user’s smart card and the PHR server using keys from a
hash chain to encrypt the redemption tokens. This guaran-
tees one-time use of the redemption token in an emergency
session and enables the doctor’s device to authenticate the
PHR Server. (ii) Use of policies to provide security manage-
ment in the emergency situation.
As the emergency doctor has access to the PHR (i.e., the
PHR can be decrypted using the one-time session key), noth-
ing prevents him from further disseminating the PHR to an-
other third party, although it is advocated that he must not
do so without user’s consent. In some cases, it is important
to further restrict the access to the PHR based on time in
an emergency session. In this respect, consent management
and digital rights management (DRM) technologies can be
employed in the future to enable the users to have a greater
control over the accessibility of their PHR.
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